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Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of earned and unearned remittances on agricultural 
productivity in Nepal. This approach differs from the existing practice of studying the impact of 
total remittances on socio-economic outcomes. In particular, we disaggregate total remittances into 
earned and unearned remittances, and isolate their impacts on productivity—an individual 
household’s per labor-hour production of all agricultural output at the market value. 
Methodologically, we follow a three-stage least squares (3-SLS) approach to overcome the potential 
endogeneity concerns. We provide evidence that unearned remittances are more effective than 
earned remittances in increasing agricultural productivity. These results can be useful in 
understanding the migration-remittance-productivity nexus in Nepal as well as other similar 
socioeconomic societies from South Asia. 
Keywords: earned remittance; unearned remittance; agricultural productivity; migration; Nepal; 3-
SLS 
JEL Classification: O15; F24; Q10 
 
1. Introduction 
The notion of earned and unearned factors has been studied in various contexts in economics: 
income, revenue, premium, etc. Such notion, however, is under-researched in the remittance 
literature. To fill that gap, we investigate the effect of remittance by its sources on agricultural 
productivity in Nepal. Our innovation in this paper is, first, to disaggregate the total remittances into 
two categories by their sources: earned and unearned. Then, we test if an increase in the share of 
unearned remittances results in an increase in agricultural productivity. In doing so, we also isolate 
the impact of individual remittance by its source to show the differential impacts on agricultural 
productivity—an important contribution to the existing literature on the migration-remittance-
productivity nexus. 
We define earned remittance as money received on a regular basis by a household from a family 
member who participates in employment away from their home, either in the domestic or 
international market. The family members expect this remittance to be the main source of income. 
The family uses any leftover money for activities such as a loan repayment, small-scale business 
establishment, or agricultural investment – buying land, using improved seed, putting up the 
irrigation system, using a new technology, etc. These are characteristics of most remittance receiving 
Nepalese households who have someone working outside the home and sending money on a regular 
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basis (Sapkota 2013). Alternatively, we define unearned remittance as money received by a household 
from their distant relatives, friends, or neighbors, consistent with the use of the term in the foreign 
income literature such as Smith (2008) and Ahmed (2012). This money is not obtained on a regular 
basis. The recipient typically requests/receives this money for a specific purpose and does not expect 
it to be their main source of income. Since agriculture remains the main profession for the majority 
of Nepalese households (Maharjan et al. 2012), which includes over 70% of the population (World 
Bank 2018), we assume that part of the unearned remittance is invested in the agricultural sector to 
buy farm equipment, seed, fertilizer, etc. With that background, it is meaningful to analyze the role 
of earned and unearned remittances in influencing agricultural productivity, which is an unknown a 
priori. This ambiguity results from the fact that the household receiving earned remittance has its 
member away from home and that person could otherwise be productive in their own farm. In 
contrast, the remitted funds could be used to offset the production loss due to migration through an 
increased investment in agricultural sector.  
To explore the effect of remittances by their sources on agricultural productivity, we use the 
Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) 2010/2011 dataset from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
Nepal. This survey follows the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
methodology that adopts a two-stage stratified sampling method. It includes cross-sectional data 
from five developmental regions and three ecological belts, comprising both urban and rural 
residences. The nationwide dataset, conducted by the CBS with technical support from the World 
Bank, consists of 5988 households from 499 primary sampling units (PSUs). These data contain 
different aspects of household welfare such as demographic composition, migration, remittances, 
consumption, education, employment, landholding, agricultural investment and production, 
irrigation, distance to facilities, household head characteristics, and many others. 
Methodologically, we use a three stage least squares (3-SLS) approach to address the potential 
endogeneity issue that could result due to simultaneity bias. Such bias may arise because of the 
situation that households with higher agricultural productivity may have fewer migrants and thus 
receive a low amount of remittances and vice-versa. Similarly, there are some household 
characteristics, such as the share of children in the household, which affect both the agricultural 
productivity and the amount of remittance received. In employing the 3-SLS method, first, we predict 
migration given the household characteristics and average migrants at the PSU. Then, we predict 
remittances based on the values of migrants estimated above, along with other household 
characteristics. Finally, we analyze the impact of predicted remittances by sources on agricultural 
productivity. 
Our analyses show that an increase in the share of unearned remittances increases agricultural 
productivity. These results are robust to multiple econometric specifications. We compare the impact 
of earned and unearned remittances separately to show that unearned remittances indeed produce a 
bigger impact than do earned remittances. These results are consistent with existing theoretical 
arguments that highlight income fungibility issues (Friedman 1957; Thaler 1985; De and Ratha 2012, 
etc.). The results are important to understand the contribution of remittances by sources in economic 
performance of the remittance-receiving households in Nepal. These results can be useful in 
understanding the link between migration, remittance, and productivity in other societies from South 
Asia that have similar social, cultural, and economic practices, as suggested by Chakrabarti (2018). 
Moving on, Section 2 of this paper provides a background on migration, remittance, and 
agricultural practices in Nepal along with a review of related literature; Section 3 presents a 
conceptual framework that explains how earned and unearned remittances may result in different 
outcomes on agricultural productivity; Section 4 provides a description of the data; Section 5 explains 
the econometric methodology; Section 6 presents the empirical results; and Section 7 concludes with 
a discussion.  
2. Background: Migration, Remittance, and Agricultural Productivity in Nepal 
International migration of the Nepalese people has significantly increased since the mid-1990s. 
Before this, migration was limited, occurring primarily within the country and to the neighboring 
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states of India for seasonal and temporary employment. Nepal and India share a 1758 km long open 
border, which does not require any documents or approval to cross from either side. This has allowed 
for easy migration between the two countries. Having said that, the proportion of Nepalese migrants 
going to India out of the total migrants going abroad decreased from 93.1% in 1991 to 37.6% in 2011 
(MLE 2018). Foreign employment outside India continues to be the most significant motivation for 
international migration from Nepal and it has increased dramatically over time: 3605 people migrated 
in 1993/1994 and that number jumped to more than 100,000 each year recently. Indeed, as of early 
2018 about 1600 Nepalese left the country daily for foreign employment in Gulf countries and 
Malaysia (Shrestha 2018). According to the 2018 MLE report, 85% of the labor migration between 
2008 and 2015 occurred in the seven countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen), mostly involving manufacturing and unspecified general 
labor (as high as 78%). A small portion migrates to countries such as Australia, Israel, South Korea as 
well as some European and North American countries. 
The migration pattern described above have resulted in a scarcity of farm workers in Nepal, 
negatively affecting the agricultural sector. A majority of these migrants sends a portion of their 
income back to their families and the Nepalese economy depends on remittance; it accounts for as 
much as 30% of the GDP (World Bank 2018). Given a significant contribution to the national economy, 
we can ask many questions about how such remittance shapes individual household economics. How 
does the household use the remitted money? Is it spent in the consumption sector or is it invested in 
a productive sector? If invested, what sectors does it go to? Does remittance income offset the 
production loss due to migration through an improvement in agricultural productivity of the 
remittance-receiving households? If so, what could be the role of earned and unearned remittances? 
This paper focuses on the issue of crop income per labor-hour for a household, what we call 
individual agricultural productivity. 
Existing literature on remittance analyze its impacts both at the macro level using country level 
data and the microeconomic issues using household level data. The existing literature on 
microeconomic impact of remittance use household data to study outcomes such as assets (Adams 
1998), poverty (Adams 2005), education (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2010), health (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2011a), and income smoothing (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2011b). There is, 
however, limited research on the impact of remittance on agricultural productivity. In a broader 
context, a study by Atamanov and Van den Berg (2012) found a positive impact of remittances and 
negative impact of migration on crop income in the Kyrgyz Republic. In the particular case of Nepal, 
the limited analysis of the relationship between remittance and productivity uses the total (vis-a-vis 
disaggregated) remittance (Tuladhar et al. 2014; Khanal et al. 2015; Kapri and Ghimire 2020). 
While it may be tempting to think that the source of remittance (earned vs. unearned) shouldn’t 
matter, literature shows that the source of income may have different impacts on consumption 
(Thomas 1990; Lundberg et al. 1997; Levin 1998; Imbens et al. 1999; Hawkins and Wallace 2006; 
Christiaensen and Pan 2010; Thaler 1985, 1990). Existing discussion on the relationship between 
remittance and agricultural productivity shows different impacts depending on the size of farm but 
not on the type of farming or ranching currently underway (Davis and Lopez-Carr 2014). A study by 
de Brauw (2010), however, shows that remittance changes the structure of farming from traditional 
to cash crops. In that context, we hypothesize that the source of remittance not only influences 
consumption decision, but also influences investment decisions that changes the farm structure. In 
the case of Nepal, the effect of remittance on a household’s investment in education, health, and 
durable goods is also a function of whether the remittance comes from abroad or urban-rural 
migration (Mohanty et al. 2014). We extend this analysis in the case of agricultural productivity by 
disaggregating total remittance into earned and unearned. We conceptualize this framework in the 
following section. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
Traditional economic theories, Friedman (1957) for instance, assume that income is fungible and 
the source of income does not matter. However, Christiaensen and Pan (2010) highlight the work of 
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Thaler (1985, 1990) and argue that the fungibility assumption is increasingly challenged by behavioral 
economists. Building on insights from cognitive psychology, they argue that people 
compartmentalize their income into different mental accounts and decide on their consumption 
within each of these accounts. This creates a direct link between source of income and spending 
behavior and is in sharp contrast to the standard consumption model, where consumption decisions 
are integrated into one single optimization problem, and income is in effect treated as fungible. 
Based on the fungibility argument, we postulate the following hypothesis as shown in Figure 1: 
earned income is fungible, unearned income is less so. That is, each unit of earned remittance is the 
same and is replaceable with another unit. Therefore, earned remittance that is meant for something 
else can be spent on household expenditure and vice versa. However, this is less likely to happen 
with unearned remittance, which are more likely targeted for a specific purpose. Literature shows 
that most monetary gifts come with strings attached—they are targeted for a specific purpose. 
Moreover, most loans, whether from banks or family, are made with a specific understanding of what 
the money will be used for. That specific purpose can be buying a piece of land, investing in 
agriculture, etc. In Nepal this has been a popular lending/borrowing practice, as the majority of such 
financial transactions (loans/grants) occur for land and agricultural purposes (Hatlebakk 2009). 
Unless someone is an extremely altruistic individual (who would give money for any reason or no 
reason), they are more likely to send money to a distant relative or friend for a productive use, or an 
investment that would yield some return in the end. De and Ratha (2012) argue that remittance 
income is targeted better and not as fungible as other sources of transfer income. They claim that the 
amount and the potential use of remittance income are often decided upon jointly by the sender and 
the recipient. We argue the specificity about expected use of the money being more pronounced with 
unearned remittance than earned remittance. 
 
Figure 1. Remittance Flow Chart. 
Our assumptions of unearned remittance being invested and earned remittance being consumed 
are guided by the permanent income hypothesis proponed by Friedman (1957). The permanent 
income hypothesis states that people spend money at a level consistent with their expected long-term 
average. In our case, unearned remittance would not be a part of the expected long-term average 
income indicated by the hypothesis; and hence, we argue that people may not consider it part of their 
regular consumption. Instead, the hypothesis predicts that people would save this money. Economic 
theories of savings and investment predict that such savings are invested. In the Nepalese context, 
these investments are more likely to go either towards establishing small business or improving 
agricultural practices 1 (Pant 2011, p. 2). In this paper, we focus on the agricultural sector alone. 
                                                 
 
1 In the Nepal Living Standards Survey (2010/2011), 56% of the 5,988 households receive remittances. From 
Table 1, the average earned remittance is Rs. 49,084.57 (i.e., exp10.8013) or $672.48 (@ 1 USD = RS. 72.99 annual 
average in 2011) and unearned remittance is Rs. 3668.73 (i.e., exp8.2076) or $50.26. Those households that 
receive earned remittances on average invest Rs. 5562.23 (or $76.2) in agriculture. Those who receive 
unearned remittances invest Rs. 6696.55 (or $91.75). That is, the average investment to remittance ratio for 
households with earned remittances is 0.1133 whereas this ratio for households with unearned remittances 
is much higher at 1.8253. This supports the idea that unearned remittances help complement a household’s 
investment in agriculture. As a result, the higher investment in agriculture for those households with 
unearned remittances is consistent with our assumption. 
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4. Data 
This study uses the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) 2010/2011 dataset from Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Nepal, which follows the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) methodology that adopts a two-stage stratified sampling method. It includes cross-
sectional data from five developmental regions, three ecological belts, and urban/rural residence. 
These data contain different aspects of household welfare such as demographic composition, 
migration, remittances, consumption, education, employment, landholding, agricultural investment 
and production, irrigation, distance to facilities, household head characteristics and many others. For 
the purpose of this study, the analysis is limited to agricultural production and income, migration, 
and remittances (earned and unearned). The dataset consists of 5988 households from 499 primary 
sampling units (PSUs). Our sample is restricted to the 3996 households that are involved in some 
kind of agricultural activity, which is about 2/3rd of the 5988 sample 2. However, we end up having 
about 1107–1460 households in the final regressions because of missing values for agricultural 
productivity, migration, remittances and/or other control variables. The summary statistics of 
variables that we use in the paper are reported in Table 1. We construct the variables required for our 
study as follows: 
1. Earned remittances inflows (only from household members): The survey provides the 
information on cash remittances and in-kind remittances received only from household 
members. We use this information to construct the variable earned remittances inflows. We take 
natural log of this variable in the regression analysis. 
2. Unearned remittances inflows (only from non-household members): The survey provides the 
information on cash remittances and in-kind remittances received only from non-household 
members. We use this information to construct the variable unearned remittances inflows. We 
take natural log of this variable in the regression analysis. 
3. Share of unearned remittances inflows: This is the ratio of unearned remittances to the total 
remittances inflows for each household 3 , i.e., share of unearned remittances௜ =
 
୳୬ୣୟ୰୬ୣୢ ୰ୣ୫୧୲୲ୟ୬ୡୣୱ೔
୲୭୲ୟ୪ ୰ୣ୫୧୲୲ୟ୬ୡୣୱ೔
  
4. Number of migrants: If an individual is away from the household for more than 6 months out 
of the last 12 months or has recently left and is expected to be away for more than 6 months and 
will return to the same household in the future, they are considered as migrant. We use this 
information to calculate the total number of migrants in a household. 
5. Agricultural productivity: The survey provides the information on crops (such as paddy, wheat, 
maize, and other cereals) produced by households, price of crop, and number of labor hours 
used in farm activity. Crop production, price of crop, and labor man days (equivalent to eight 
hours of work per day) are used to construct the variable crop production (in monetary value) 
per labor hour for each household. We take natural log of this variable in the regression analysis.  
                                                 
 
2 We are thankful to an anonymous referee who pointed out this sample size to be inconsistent with the most 
recent Nepal Labor Force Survey (CBS 2018) which shows only 21.5% of the population being employed in 
agriculture. The discrepancy in employment rates by sectors between 2010/2011 (when the NLSS survey took 
place) to 2017/2018 (when the NLFS survey took place) is due to several structural changes in the Nepalese 
economy between the two periods: the political transformation of the country, dramatic increase in 
emigration, the devastating earthquake of 2015, the border blockade of 2016, etc. 
3 In the NLSS data, there are certain households that receive both earned and unearned remittances and there 
are some that receive only one. Specifically, there are about 56% of the 5988 households in the sample that 
receive some sort of remittances. Out of them 1867 households receive unearned remittances and 2013 
households receive earned remittances. Those who receive none or a minimal amount of earned remittances 
(from migrant household members) are likely to get a larger amount of unearned remittance (from non-
household members such as family friends, relatives, neighbors, etc.) and vice versa in the context of Nepal 
due to cultural and social practices.  
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6. Other household characteristics: The survey provides rich information about the households. 
Some of the other characteristics we use in this study include household size, household 
landholding, investment in agricultural sector, irrigation dummy, urban dummy (urban = 1, 
rural = 0), ecological belt dummy, share of the children in various age groups, share of female, 
share of elders, and many others. 
7. Household head characteristics: The survey also provides household head characteristics. Some 
of those characteristics that we use in our study include household head sex, age, education, 
occupation, and marital status. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln (agricultural productivity) 3996 5.26182 1.08326 0.12297 12.0509 
Ln (remittances inflows) 5988 5.27303 5.15535 0 15.8034 
Ln (earned remittances inflows) 2013 10.8013 1.42176 0 15.0965 
Ln (unearned remittances inflows) 1867 8.2076 1.59156 0 15.8034 
Share of unearned remittances inflows 1867 0.6744 0.43585 0 1 
Ln (number of migrants) 2014 0.78368 0.19493 0.69315 2.07944 
Ln (distance to nearest facility) 5832 1.17847 0.62973 0 6.68586 
Loan dummy (outstanding loan = 1) 5988 0.62034 0.48534 0 1 
Ln (household size) 5988 1.6793 0.39528 0.69315 3.09104 
Share of children age 15 under 5988 0.33683 0.23729 0 1 
Share of female age16–64 5988 0.33774 0.18763 0 1 
Share of elders age 64 above 5988 0.07194 0.1767 0 1 
HHH sex (male = 1) 5988 0.73309 0.44238 0 1 
HHH age 5988 45.9965 14.1329 11 95 
HHH age squared 5988 2315.38 1383.17 121 9025 
HHH marital dummy (married = 1) 5988 0.76115 0.42642 0 1 
HHH education 5752 0.38456 0.75074 0 4 
HHH occupation wage in agriculture 5988 0.02973 0.16986 0 1 
HHH occupation wage in non-agriculture 5988 0.19258 0.39436 0 1 
HHH occupation self-employed in agriculture 5988 0.50843 0.49997 0 1 
HHH occupation self-employed in non-agriculture 5988 0.15868 0.36541 0 1 
Urban dummy (urban = 1) 5988 0.33673 0.47263 0 1 
Mountain belt dummy 5988 0.06815 0.25202 0 1 
Hill belt dummy 5988 0.53516 0.4988 0 1 
Irrigation dummy (irrigated land = 1) 4264 0.60718 0.48844 0 1 
Ln (land per person) 4264 7.20761 1.42158 0 11.8435 
Ln (investment per person) 4510 6.19227 1.71024 0 12.0867 
Note: When we take natural log (Ln), we add 1 to the corresponding values; HHH denotes household head. 
5. Econometric Method 
5.1. Econometric Specification 
To test the hypothesis that the impact of unearned remittances on agricultural productivity is 
higher than earned remittances, we apply the iterative three-stage least square approach. In the first 
stage, we estimate the number of migrants per household using following regression equation: 
ln_ܯ௜ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܺெ௜ +  ߙଶܣܯ_ܷܲܵெ௜ + ߟܦ௨௥௕௔௡ +  ߣܦ௕௘௟௧ + ߝெ௜ (1) 
where ln_ܯ௜ stands for number of migrants for the household i, XMi stands for household human-
capital measures such as household characteristics and household head characteristics. Similarly, 
Durban stands for urban dummy, Dbelt stands for ecological belt dummies (mountain dummy and hill 
dummy) and ߝெ௜ stands for error term. It is likely that households in the same locality have similar 
migration decisions. To identify this equation, we also use ܣܯ_ܷܲܵெ௜  (the average of migrant 
population from other households within the PSU) as an exogenous control variable. In particular, 
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for each PSU, the average of migrants not including household i itself is calculated. This is a standard 
practice in the literature (Rozelle et al. 1999). 
In the second stage, we estimate remittances using the following regression equation: 
ln_ܴ௜ = ߜ଴ + ߜଵln_ܯ෣ ௜ +  ߜଶܺோ௜ + ߜଷ ܣܴ_ܷܲܵோ௜ + ߟܦ௨௥௕௔௡ + ߣܦ௕௘௟௧ +  ߝோ௜  (2) 
where ln_ܴ௜ is remittances received by household i. We estimate this equation three times, one each 
for (i) the share of unearned remittances, (ii) earned remittances, and (iii) unearned remittances. 
 ln_ܯ෣ ௜  is estimated number of migrants for household i from the first stage, XRi is household 
characteristics and household head characteristics that affect remittances, and ߝோ௜ is the error term. 
Here, we use two different kinds of remittances—earned and unearned. It is likely that the remittance 
inflows in a household increases with the remittance inflows in the same PSU. So, to identify this 
equation we also use ܣܴ_ܷܲܵோ௜  (the average of remittances from other households within the PSU, 
a community-level variable that is a proxy for the local remittance flow) as an exogenous control 
variable as in Rozelle et al. (1999). In particular, for each PSU, the average of remittances not including 
household i itself is calculated. 
The final equations of recursive systems are: 
ln_ܣ݃ݎ݅_ܲݎ݋݀௜ = ߚଵ଴ + ߚଵଵݏℎܽݎ݁_ܴ෣ ௜ + ߚଵଶln_ܯ෣ ௜ + ߛଵܺுா௜ + ߟଵܦ௨௥௕௔௡ + ߣଵܦ௕௘௟௧
+ ߝଵுா௜ 
(3) 
ln_ܣ݃ݎ݅_ܲݎ݋݀௜ = ߚଶ଴ + ߚଶଵln_݁ܽݎ݊݁݀_ܴప෣ + ߚଶଶln_ܯ෣ ௜ + ߛଶܺுா௜ + ߟଶܦ௨௥௕௔௡ + ߣଶܦ௕௘௟௧
+ ߝଶுா௜ 
(4) 
ln_ܣ݃ݎ݅_ܲݎ݋݀௜ = ߚଷ଴ + ߚଷଵln_ݑ݊݁ܽݎ݊݁݀_ܴప෣ + ߚଷଶln_ܯ෣ ௜ + ߛଷܺுா௜ + ߟଷܦ௨௥௕௔௡
+ ߣଷܦ௕௘௟௧ + ߝଷுா௜ 
(5) 
where ln_ܣ݃ݎ݅_ܲݎ݋݀௜  stands for household level agricultural production per labor-hour (in 
monetary value, Nepalese rupees), ݏℎܽݎ݁_ܴ෣ ௜  stands for estimated share of unearned remittances, 
 ln_݁ܽݎ݊݁݀_ܴప෣  stands for estimated earned remittances,  ln_ݑ݊݁ܽݎ݊݁݀_ܴ෣ ௜  stands for estimated 
unearned remittances for household i from the second stage shown in equation (2),  ln_ܯ෣ ௜ stands for 
estimated number of migrants for household i from the first stage, and ܺுா௜ stands for household 
characteristics including household head characteristics that affect agricultural production. We take 
natural log of the variables that measure productivity and remittances. For this third stage regression 
equation, household characteristics include household size, share of children aged 0–15, share of 
elders aged 64 and above, share of number of females aged 16–64, land per person, and investment 
per person in the agricultural sector. Similarly, household head characteristics include sex, age, 
marital status, and education of household head. Finally, ߝுா௜ stands for classical error terms. ߚଵଵ, 
ߚଶଵ, and ߚଷଵ are the main coefficients of interest that we expect to be positive, based on the discussion 
in previous sections. We also expect that the impact of unearned remittance on agricultural 
productivity is stronger than the impact of earned remittance, i.e., ߚଷଵ > ߚଶଵ. 
5.2. Endogeneity of Remittance 
A remittance-receiving household is likely to be endogenous to the household agricultural 
productivity. For instance, migration is a function of household and household-head characteristics, 
remittance is a function of migration and household as well as household-head characteristics, and 
agricultural productivity is a function of remittance and migration. This implies that households with 
higher agricultural productivity may have fewer migrants, and as a result, lower remittance inflows. 
Similarly, there might be some variables that affect both agricultural productivity and remittance. To 
address the potential endogeneity issues, we use the iterative three-stage least square (3-SLS) 
approach with exogenous control variables as mentioned in a previous sub-section. In addition, we 
use urban dummy, mountain dummy, and hill dummy to capture the ecological and geographical 
differences. 
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6. Empirical Results 
The 3-SLS results show that both earned and unearned remittances as well as the share of 
unearned remittances has a positive impact on agricultural productivity as reported in the first row 
of Tables 2–4 4. Moreover, the results also show that the impact of unearned remittance is stronger 
than the impact of earned remittance as explained below. 
Table 2. Effect of share of remittances from non-household migrant member on agricultural 
productivity. Dependent variable: Log of agricultural productivity (crop production per labor-hour). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of unearned remittances inflows 
0.051 0.043 1.073 *** 0.973 ** 
(0.187) (0.191) (0.405) (0.416) 
Urban dummy (urban = 1) 
0.413 *** 0.412 *** 0.440 *** 0.442 *** 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.123) (0.123) 
Mountain dummy 
−0.221 ** −0.216 * −0.302 *** −0.292 *** 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.109) (0.112) 
Hill dummy 
−0.023 −0.024 −0.083 −0.084 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
Household size - - 
0.021 * 0.021 * 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Share of children age 15 under - - 
−0.008 −0.048 
(0.250) (0.248) 
Share of elders age 64 above - - 
0.559 ** 0.537 ** 
(0.268) (0.266) 
Share of female age16–64 - - 
0.097 0.052 
(0.325) (0.320) 
Irrigation dummy (irrigated land = 1) - - 
0.146 ** 0.148 ** 
(0.072) (0.072) 
Ln (land per person) - - 
0.254 *** 0.252 *** 
(0.038) (0.038) 
Ln (invest per person) - - 
0.081 ** 0.082 ** 
(0.040) (0.040) 
Ln (average migrants PSU) - 
−0.123 
- 
−0.233 
(0.351) (0.367) 
Constant 
5.282 *** 5.388 *** 2.632 *** 2.914 *** 
(0.123) (0.333) (0.584) (0.658) 
Observations 1153 1153 1107 1107 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.202 0.202 
Number of clusters 275 275 269 269 
All regressions are estimated by three stage least squares (3-SLS). Columns 3 and 4 also include 
household head characteristics (sex, age, marital status, education and occupation). The dependent 
variable is log of agricultural productivity (crop value per labor-hour in Nepalese rupees). Share of 
unearned remittances is estimated in the second stage of the 3-SLS. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the PSU level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
  
                                                 
 
4 The first and second stage regression results are presented in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
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Table 3. Effect of remittances only from household migrant members on agricultural productivity. 
Dependent Variable: Log of agricultural productivity (crop production per labor-hour). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (earned remittances inflows) 
0.242 *** 0.241 *** 0.263 ** 0.301 *** 
(0.080) (0.081) (0.108) (0.112) 
Urban dummy (urban = 1) 
0.382 *** 0.381 *** 0.390 *** 0.348 *** 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.109) (0.113) 
Mountain dummy 
−0.139 −0.137 −0.169 −0.123 
(0.134) (0.133) (0.128) (0.125) 
Hill dummy 
−0.149 ** −0.155 ** −0.189 *** −0.265 *** 
(0.072) (0.076) (0.072) (0.076) 
Household size - - 
−0.011 0.006 
(0.012) (0.015) 
Share of children age 15 under - - 
0.145 −0.020 
(0.222) (0.253) 
Share of elders age 64 above - - 
0.520 * 0.526 * 
(0.304) (0.300) 
Share of female age 16–64 - - 
−0.132 0.021 
(0.271) (0.272) 
Irrigation dummy (irrigated land = 1) - - 
0.162 ** 0.163 ** 
(0.065) (0.065) 
Ln (land per person) - - 
0.204 *** 0.209 *** 
(0.035) (0.035) 
Ln (invest per person) - - 
0.119 *** 0.120 *** 
(0.039) (0.039) 
Ln (number of migrants) - 
−0.244 
- 
−3.331 * 
(0.572) (1.744) 
Constant 
2.760 *** 2.965 *** 0.674 2.824 * 
(0.879) (1.067) (1.183) (1.557) 
Observations 1460 1460 1413 1413 
R−squared 0.045 0.045 0.186 0.190 
Number of clusters 355 355 350 350 
All regressions are estimated by 3-SLS. Columns 3 and 4 also include household head characteristics 
(sex, age, marital status, education and occupation). The dependent variable is log of agricultural 
productivity (crop value per labor-hour in Nepalese rupees). Variables Ln (number of migrants) and 
Ln (remittances inflows only from migrant members) are estimated values from the first and second 
stage of the 3-SLS, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PSU level. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 4. Effect of remittances from non-household migrant members on agricultural productivity. 
Dependent Variable: Log of agricultural productivity (crop production per labor-hour). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (unearned remittances inflows) 
0.516 *** 0.523 *** 0.550 *** 0.550 *** 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.120) (0.119) 
Urban dummy 
0.033 0.023 0.154 0.148 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.132) (0.133) 
Mountain dummy 
−0.392 *** −0.389 *** −0.395 *** −0.384 *** 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.110) (0.112) 
Hill dummy 
−0.251 *** −0.257 *** −0.291 *** −0.295 *** 
(0.080) (0.081) (0.094) (0.094) 
Household size - - 
0.024 ** 0.026 ** 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Share of children age 15 under - - 
0.184 0.146 
(0.229) (0.224) 
Share of elders age 64 above - - 
0.621 ** 0.609 ** 
(0.255) (0.253) 
Share of female age 16–64 - - 
−0.030 −0.017 
(0.262) (0.261) 
Irrigation dummy (irrigated land = 1) - - 
0.153 ** 0.156 ** 
(0.071) (0.071) 
Ln (land per person) - - 
0.246 *** 0.245 *** 
(0.036) (0.036) 
Ln (invest per person) - - 
0.081 ** 0.082 ** 
(0.038) (0.038) 
Ln (average migrants PSU) - 
−0.212 
- 
−0.421 
(0.392) (0.443) 
Constant 
1.391 ** 1.511 ** −1.196 −0.865 
(0.638) (0.665) (1.176) (1.164) 
Observations 1153 1153 1107 1107 
R−squared 0.059 0.060 0.217 0.219 
Number of clusters 275 275 269 269 
All regressions are estimated by 3-SLS. Columns 3 and 4 also include household head characteristics 
(sex, age, marital status, education and occupation). The dependent variable is log of agricultural 
productivity (crop value per labor-hour in Nepalese rupees). Ln (remittances inflows only from non-
household migrant members) variable is estimated in the second stage of the 3-SLS. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at PSU level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
In Table 2, we analyze the impact of the share of unearned remittances on the agricultural 
productivity. All specifications include urban dummy, hill dummy, and mountain dummy. Columns 
(3) and (4) also include household and household head characteristics as control variables. Robust 
standard errors in all of these specifications are clustered at the PSU level 5 . Even though the 
coefficients of the share of unearned remittances to total remittances in columns (1) and (2) are 
statistically insignificant, those are positive in sign. In columns (3) and (4), with all control variables, 
the corresponding coefficients are statistically significant and positive. Looking at column (3), we can 
conclude that a one percent increase in the share of unearned remittances increases agricultural 
productivity by 1.924 percent 6. When we evaluate economic significance of this result at the sample 
average, a ten percent increase in this share (for instance, from the average value of 67.44 percent to 
                                                 
 
5 McKenzie (2017) summarizes the work of Abadie et al. (2017) where they suggest that we cluster robust 
standard errors at the PSU level because there are other PSUs in the population of interest beyond those seen 
in the sample. 
6 Note: exp1.073 − 1= 1.924. 
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74.24 percent) leads to a 19.24 percent increase in productivity (from Rs. 193 to Rs. 230) 7. Similarly, 
coefficient in column (4) shows that a one percent increase in the share of unearned remittances 
increases the agricultural productivity by 1.646 percent. Hence, the results reveal a positive and 
significant impact of the share of unearned remittances on agricultural productivity. This is consistent 
with the theoretical predictions that unearned remittance is less fungible and is potentially invested. 
Results in Tables 3 and 4 show that the disaggregated measures of earned and unearned 
remittances separately influence agricultural productivity positively. In Table 3, we can see that the 
coefficients of log of remittances inflows only from household migrant members are positive and 
statistically significant, and range from 0.242 to 0.301. Similarly, in Table 4, we can see that the 
coefficients of log of remittances inflows only from non-household migrant members are positive and 
statistically significant, and range from 0.516 to 0.550. These coefficients exhibit that unearned 
remittances have a greater impact on agricultural productivity than earned remittances. Other 
covariates, including migration, have expected signs. 
To get a deeper insight into the size of these coefficients, we perform multiple tests to check if 
the difference in the magnitude from two sources of remittance (unearned vs. earned) is statistically 
different. We test the following hypothesis using the seemingly unrelated estimation method 8 to see 
if the difference is statistically significant:  
ܪ଴: ߚଶଵ = ߚଷଵ 
ܪଵ: ߚଶଵ ≠  ߚଷଵ 
The test rejects the null hypothesis and supports the claim that the effect from earned and 
unearned remittances on agricultural productivity are statistically different. We find that the value 
of chi-squared is 3.25 and that it is statistically significant at ten percent significance level. Although 
the results varied depending on the econometric specification, the results confirm that there is a 
difference in the magnitude of the coefficients, as expected, between the two measures: in the range 
of 0.241 to 0.301 for earned remittances vs. 0.516 to 0.550 for unearned remittances (See Tables 3 and 
4). 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper investigates the effect of remittance by sources on agricultural productivity in Nepal. 
Our innovation in this paper is to disaggregate the total remittances based on their sources into two 
categories: earned (received from immediate family member) and unearned (received from family 
friends and relatives) remittances. We test whether the impact of unearned remittances on 
agricultural productivity is greater than that of earned remittances. Although the results vary 
depending on the econometric specification, we find that a ten percent increase in the share of 
unearned remittances increases the agricultural productivity by as much as 19.24 percent, which is 
an increase of Rs. 37 per labor-hour (from Rs. 193 to Rs. 230). We also find evidence that the impact 
of unearned remittances is significantly greater than earned remittances in increasing agricultural 
productivity. This finding explains what happens in agricultural households of Nepal. People from 
farming families go work somewhere else and send money home and the family counts on this 
regular income, i.e., earned remittances. Some families also get unearned remittances (from non-
household members such as family friends, relatives, neighbors, etc.). And, it’s the second category 
of funds that actually have the biggest impact on agricultural productivity. Our analysis stems mainly 
from the fact that source of income changes an individual’s decisions based on the fungibility 
argument. If one has to ask someone else for the money, or the money comes in as a surprise, people 
are more thoughtful about what they are going to do with it. Especially, if they have to humble 
                                                 
 
7 Calculated at the average value of productivity for the sample at exp5.262 = 192.87 
8 This is accomplished using the suest command in STATA, a post-estimation test. A complete analysis on the 
topic could be performed using the seemingly unrelated regressions method following Zellner (1962). 
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themselves to ask a relative for a loan or gift to accomplish whatever it is they are trying to do. Our 
empirical results are consistent with the theoretical argument that unearned remittance is less 
fungible than earned remittance, and hence, the two categories have statistically different impacts on 
agricultural productivity. 
In addition to the fungibility argument, the distinction between earned and unearned 
remittances are supported by the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) and the life-cycle 
hypothesis of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). According to these hypotheses, households smooth 
their consumption over time. Their consumption level is thus determined by their 
permanent/anticipated income and is independent of their total current income, implying a large 
marginal propensity to consume out of permanent/anticipated income and a low marginal 
propensity to consume out of transitory/unanticipated income. Therefore, if earned remittance works 
as anticipated income and unearned remittance as unanticipated income, the first would be 
consumed and the second would be saved/invested, thus increasing agricultural productivity. 
Although our conclusions are based on the Nepalese household sample, these results could explain 
the migration-remittance-productivity nexus in other South Asian countries that have social, cultural, 
and economic similarities, according to the arguments presented by Chakrabarti (2018). 
While these results are interesting, there are some caveats to this analysis: we assume that certain 
funds go to agriculture because that has been the main profession of people in Nepal. The question 
of whether families indeed use all of remittance income to improve agricultural productivity is not 
clear. In areas where children are expected to contribute to parent’s lifestyle, earned remittances may 
be just as likely to go for making the parent’s lives easier and happier instead of going towards 
improving the farm itself. In societies where it is unusual for family members to send money home, 
choices would be different. Also, imperfect/asymmetric information between remittance senders and 
recipients can possibly deviate the preferences of the recipients and this could alter the results 
pertaining to unearned remittance. Previous studies on remittance suggest that the majority of the 
money goes into buying land and buildings, but it’s not sure if they are buying agricultural land. A 
potential explanation for lower impact of the earned remittance could be that a family member is 
absent who might be very productive otherwise. But, are families at least as productive without the 
person as they were with the person? What if the remaining family members are bad farmers? Other 
than investments, people do have emergencies and need extra cash for personal reasons. Farmers 
may have to face a bad weather/poor harvest and need money for living expenses just until the next 
harvest. In addition, if people invest in sectors other than agriculture, how would earned and 
unearned remittances impact non-agricultural productivity? These would be interesting questions to 
address in future research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Estimation of number of migrants and earned remittances inflows. Dependent Variables: 
log of migrants (Column 1) and log of earned remittances (Column 2). 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Ln (Number of Migrants) Ln (Earned Remittances Inflows) 
Ln (estimated number of migrants) - 
4.356 *** 
(1.132) 
Ln (household size) 
0.038 *** 
- 
(0.015) 
Share of children age 15 under 
−0.049 0.602 *** 
(0.032) (0.206) 
Share of elders age 64 above 
−0.001 −1.083 *** 
(0.041) (0.241) 
Share of female age16–64 
0.051 0.029 
(0.039) (0.262) 
Ln (distance to nearest facility) 
0.001 −0.087 * 
(0.006) (0.048) 
Loan dummy 
−0.010 −0.001 
(0.010) (0.065) 
Ln (average migrants by PSU) 
0.104 ** 
- 
(0.045) 
Ln (average remittance inflows by PSU) - 
0.360 *** 
(0.050) 
Constant 
−0.875 * 3.262 *** 
(0.447) (1.021) 
Observations 1890 1888 
R-squared 0.073 0.163 
Number of clusters 422 421 
All regressions include a constant, urban dummy and belt effects (hill and mountain dummies). 
Similarly, all regressions include household head characteristics (sex, age, marital status, education 
and occupation), and household head wage/self-employed status in agricultural sector/non-
agricultural sector. The dependent variable is log of number of migrants in column 1 and log of 
remittances inflows only from household migrants in column 2. Variable Ln (number of migrants) is 
estimated values from the first stage. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the PSU 
level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table A2. Estimation of number of migrants and unearned remittances inflows. Dependent Variables: 
log of migrants (Column 1) and log of unearned remittances inflows (Column 2). 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Ln (Number of Migrants) Ln (Unearned Remittances Inflows) 
Ln (estimated number of migrants) - 
−0.003 
(0.251) 
Ln (household size) 
0.038 *** 
- 
(0.012) 
Share of children age 15 under 
−0.060 ** −0.829 *** 
(0.027) (0.200) 
Share of elders age 64 above 
−0.029 −0.524 ** 
(0.036) (0.215) 
Share of female age16–64 
0.022 −0.629 ** 
(0.032) (0.281) 
Ln (distance to nearest facility) 
−0.007 −0.145 *** 
(0.004) (0.055) 
Loan dummy 
−0.008 −0.208 *** 
(0.008) (0.075) 
Ln (average migrants by PSU) 
0.832 *** 
- 
(0.019) 
Ln (average remittance inflows by PSU) - 
0.214 *** 
(0.043) 
Constant 
−1.036 *** 7.653 *** 
(0.377) (0.484) 
Observations 1933 1661 
R-squared 0.297 0.284 
Number of Clusters 465 346 
All regressions include a constant, urban dummy, and belt effects (hill and mountain dummies). 
Similarly, all regressions include household head characteristics (sex, age, marital status, education 
and occupation), and household head wage/self-employed status in agricultural sector/non-
agricultural sector. The dependent variable is log of number of migrants in column 1 and log of 
remittances inflows only from non-household migrants in column 2. Variable Ln (number of 
migrants) is estimated values from the first stage. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
at the PSU level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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